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The purpose of this report is to assess the feasibility
of attacking a target with the simultaneous use of air and
artillery. A method for generating circular error probabil-
ity as a function of release altitude is presented.
Techniques for determining probabilities of kill for the air
attack system, artillery system, and for the combined air-
artillery attack system are examined. From the probability
of kill information and from the rate of fire (delivery) of
the systems, expected time to target destruction calculations
are developed. The restrictions that allow the use of the
combined air-artillery attack system are presented, as well
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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the course of history there has been an
interaction between technology and military tactics. For
example in Europe prior to 1330 the use of the mounted
armored knight or cavalry had relegated the infantry or
foot soldiers to a relatively minor role in battle. In the
battle of Bannockburn in 1332 the Scots introduced dismounted
knights who fought as mailed spearmen defending the archers
(using the long bow) on both wings. When the attacking
English had been demoralized by the long bow's arrows the
knights took to horse again in their proper cavalry function
of charging the scattered English force. This battle served
to demonstrate the value of a balanced force and the value
of the proper use of the technology (the long bow) of the
time. (Ref. 14)
Recent developments in military hardware make possible
an interesting and potentially effective tactic, the attack
of a target with the simultaneous use of air and artillery
in close support of friendly forces. This tactic represents
a significant change in doctrine. The hardware developments
include, 1) automated unit position location and reporting
system data link (Ref. 12), 2) high accuracy target locating
and ranging devices (lasar designators and ranging devices,
anti-personnel radars, plus other passive and active sensors)
(Ref. 12), 3) rapid fire, mobile, multibarrel, radar/optically
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directed anti-aircraft machine gun systems (12.7mm, 14.5mm,
23mm, 57mm, 20mm Vulcan), plus hand launched anti-air
missiles (strella, redeye, etc.) (Ref. 12), 4) compact high
accuracy (8-12 mils) air delivery systems (based upon
inertial platforms, multimode radars, digital bombing compu-
ters, AN/TPQ-27 radar, etc.) (Ref 20), and 5) the new
concept of the universal forward observer who functions as
a forvvard air controller, a naval gunfire spotter, and an
artillery forward observer (Rex. 21).
The purpose of this report is to investigate the practic-
ability of attacking a target with the simultaneous use of
air and artillery in close support of friendly forces. It
will be necessary to consider the restrictions that must be
imposed on the air delivery system (minimum altitudes,
azimuth of attack, etc.) and on the artillery system (low
angle fire, no VT fuzes, etc.). These restrictions will
allow discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the
method of attack.
The infantry commander has a wide variety of options
available to him with respect to the use of supporting arms.
Upon encountering an enemy force the infantry commander
must decide how he will attack the enemy unit. The commander
consults his operations officer, air liaison, and artillery
liaison officers, if the situation permits, and formulates
a plan of attack. If it is decided that close air support
is required the commander must request the air support from
higher headquarters (the Direct Air Support Center in U.S.M.C

tactical organizations) unless he is fortunate in having
air on-station (Ref. 9). The request for close air support
is processed by higher headquarters to the squadron that
scrambles the air strike. A minimum of 15 to 30 minutes is
required between the request for air support and the arrival
of the strike force on station. Due to the mobility of many
targets such as mechanized infantry or armor, it is often
necessary to "fix" or pin down the enemy force in the target
area. If the enemy force is not pinned down by some means
prior to the arrival of the attack aircraft, the enemy
force may not be visible or may be too close to friendly
forces to allow the air to effectively attack. To prevent
the enemy force from leaving the battle area and in an
effort to cause enemy casualties the commander can use his
supporting mortars and artillery. Artillery and mortar fire
can begin within one to five minutes, if immediate clearance
to fire is obtained from the Fire Support Coordination
Center. Upon arrival of the attack aircraft on-station the
artillery and mortar units stop firing. The forward air
controller orients the attack aircraft with respect to the
target location, friendly unit location, azimuth of attack,
and mode of delivery of ordnance. One or more non-firing
passes may be required to insure proper target identification
This procedure results in a two to eight minute delay between
the last impact of an artillery or mortar round and the first
air ordnance effect on the target area. It is during this
two to eight minute delay that the enemy force has the
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opportunity to prepare anti-aircraft weapons or alternatively
to disperse and vacate the target area.
Studies have shown that there is little that can be
done to diminish the 15 to 30 minute reaction time between
request for air support and arrival of the attack aircraft.
The problem associated with the delay in arrival of close
air support is reduced through the use of artillery and
mortars. The communication of target location and descrip-
tion from a ground vantage to the aircraft viewpoint is at
best difficult. The attack aircraft have the additional
problem of locating and identifying friendly forces near the
target area. In close air support strikes one aircraft
attacks at a time, hence only a small portion of the target
area is actually under fire at any time. The intermittent
nature of fire from air strikes and the small area that
actually receives fire can have a negative effect in terms
of aircraft losses and in terms of reduced bombing accuracy
due to enemy ground fire.
At this point it is reasonable to ask, "Why do we
interrupt the artillery fire on the target area, when this
fire can reduce or eliminate the enemy ground fire and can
also cause enemy casualties?" Instead of continuous fire on
the target area, current doctrine results in intermittent
fire from one aircraft at a time on a small portion of the
target area. Borrowing from the infantry tactic of the base
of fire, we could use the artillery like the base of fire and
the attack aircraft as the maneuverable attacking force.

The artillery fire could be concentrated against the enemy
anti-air systems and also against the main hard target which
is the prime target of the attack aircraft. With the enemy
anti-air systems under attack by the artillery, the close
air support aircraft could press their attack without having
to be overly concerned about the enemy anti-air systems. By
using both air and artillery at the same time we now have
continuous fire over the whole target area.
One consideration that is currently given for not using
artillery and air on the same target is that aircraft and
artillery shells in the same air space at the same time
result in very nervous pilots, poor bombing accuracy, and
high aircraft losses. An analysis in this paper will be
made with respect to the extent, if any, to which aircraft
and artillery shells will compete for air space in attacking
the same target at the same time.
Air system models are described in Chapter II. Included
in the air models are CEP-Altitude of Release relationships,
slant range model, probability of kill calculations, radius
of turn, and expected number of bombs to destroy a target.
Chapter III is devoted to the development of the artillery
models, parameters, and ballistic characteristics. 155mm
Howitzer data is used to generate the required input para-
meters for the models. In Chapter IV the interaction between
the artillery projectiles and the attack aircraft is modelled,
plus the concept of the danger space is developed. The air
attack and artillery system restrictions, summary of results,




II . THE AIR DELIVERY MODEL
As an integral part of this investigation it is useful
to develop a relationship between circular error probability
and altitude of weapon release for various attack aircraft.
This relationship will be used as a source of input data for
probability of kill calculations, expected number of bombs
to kill, and other calculations. A brief overview of current
air system characteristics and other factors which contribute
to circular error probability will precede the development
of the air models.
Current air systems developments indicate that it is
reasonable to assume that the attack aircraft of the mid-to-
late 1970' s will be at least as effective in firing accuracy
as the currently flying A-7E and A-6E aircraft. The A-7E and
A-6E systems include an inertial platform, a multimode radar
system, a heads-up display, a very flexible digital bombing
computer, and other sensors (Ref. 6, 7, 15, 19, 20). The
digital computer may be used to compute lead angles for aim-
ing rockets and machine guns, and for determining the best
release point for delivering ballistic and terminally guided
ordnance. The avionics system allows both manual and
automatic release of bombs and rockets and firing of machine
guns (Ref. 15, 20). The avionics of these two attack
aircraft allow a great deal of flexibility in the manner in
which air ordnance is delivered and also in the type of
ordnance which they may use.
H

Errors that affect an air-delivered weapon after release
from the aircraft are called inherent weapon delivery errors.
These inherent weapon delivery errors do not include sensor
errors (elevation angle, azimuth, range, 3-axis velocity
measurement), computer errors (ballistic equation fit and
release time), release errors (ejection velocity and
release delays), crew errors (cursor position and pilot error),
and other alignment errors prior to the release of the weapon.
Even if all errors prior to the release of the weapon were
negligible, the inherent errors would cause the weapon to
have a significant circular error probability. Inherent
errors are due to weapon dispursion, non-uniform atmospheric
density, and wind variations between the launch point and the
target
.
Ballistic dispersion or ballistic error is primarily a
function of weapon design and manufacturing quality control.
This error is proportional to the slant range from the
aircraft at the time of release to the point of impact.
Actual Ballistic Dispersion data for weapons currently in use
by U.S. forces are available from sources at the Naval
Weapons Center, China Lake, California (Ref. 3), For the
purposes of this study, ballistic dispersion will be given
a value of 5 mils.
Errors due to wind are directly proportional to the time
of flight of the weapon. The time of flight depends upon
aircraft velocity, dive angle, and altitude at time of





shear , and gust . Profile wind error has the
greatest effect on ballistic dispersion while gust error has
the least. Profile wind has a steady-state horizontal wind
velocity which consists of two independent orthogonal
components whose magnitudes are random variables. An avionics
system such as the A-6E and A-7E system with an inertial
platform is capable of effectively negating the effects of
profile wind error. Shear wind error is caused by variations
between the release altitude and the target. To compensate
for this error it is necessary to determine the wind varia-
tions between the release altitude and the target. Wind
gust errors are random and unpredictable within any micro-
atmospheric structure.
System and ballistic errors are measured in mils. This
means that for every 1000 units of path length that an
expected error of one unit/mil is realized. Due to the
relatively small cross-sectional area, the aerodynamic
design, and the high density of low drag ballistic weapons
it will be assumed that the free flight path of a low drag
bomb is essentially frictionless
.
Slant range is measured along the flight path of a
ballistically dropped bomb from point of release to point of
impact. The trajectory of a low drag bomb is pictured in
Figure 1.
Calculations of slant range will be based upon several
assumptions: a 450 knot initial velocity at time of release,








Figure 1. The Trajectory of a Low Drag Bomb
(from x
ELEASE tC> XIMPACT'
angle. From the physics of a frictionless free-falling body
it is possible to derive a function for the trajectory such
as that shown in Figure 1. The time of flight of the bomb is
given by,





release velocity in feet/second,
dive angle of the aircraft at time of release,
release altitude in feet,
accelleration of gravity, a constant, = 32.16ft/sec,
time of flight in seconds.
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Once the time of flight is known it is a simple calcula-




/vXQ ) , (Ref. 16) (2)
where v = vRsin0 + g*T and v = vRcos0 , where vy =
the vertical component of bomb velocity at time of impact in
ft. /sec. vv = the horizontal component of bomb velocity
at time of impact in ft. /sec, 6Q = the angle of impact of
the bomb with respect to the ground, and g and T are as
previously defined.
The low drag bomb trajectory shown in Figure 1 is
described by,
y = ( Vy
/v




Table 1 contains a summary of data generated from the
solution of equations (1) and (2). This data will be used
in solving the slant range and circular error probability
equations.
Table 1. Slant Range and CEP Input Data
BASIS: 450 KNOT A/C SPEED, 1-g. RELEASE









( Degrees ) (Feet)
3,000 6.247 41.57 3,000
5,000 9.414 46.06 5,000
7,000 12.166 49.53 7,000
9,000 14.633 52.28 9,000









A theorem from calculus states, "If y = f(x) is the
equation of a given curve, and if y 1 = f ' (x) is a continuous
function of x, the arc of the curve from x =C( to x =A is
rectifiable, and its length S is given by:
S = I \/l + [f'(x)] 2/dx ." (Ref. 17)
The slant range of a low drag bomb may be calculated by
applying the above theorem to equation (3) with appropriate
limits. For simplification let a = v„ and b = -(g/2v ).
so ^o
Equation (3) becomes, y = ax + bx , and dy/dx = y 1 = a + 2bx.
Slant range, S, which is measured in feet, is given by:
(1 + a 2 + 4abx + 4b2x2 )
2 dx. (4)
By symmetry (Figure 1) it is apparent that the arc length
of equation (3) from x = to x = xT is the same as the arc
length from x = xRELEAS£ to x = xIMpACT .
Standoff range, which is the horizontal range from point
of release to point of impact of the bomb, is given by;
where v and T are as previously defined. Slant range is
determined by solving the following equation;
VA+Bx+Cx2 dx, where A = 1+a 2 , B = 4ab, and c = 4b
,
o
which yeilds the following:
16





Solution of equation (6) with input data from Table 1 is
summarized in Table 2. The data contained in table 2 will be
used in the determination of circular error probability as a
function of release altitude.
Table 2
Slant Range, Standoff Range, Impact Angle and Time of Flight
BASIS: 450 KNOT A/C SPEED, 1-g RELEASE, 5 MIL BOMB
Slant Time of Impact Standoff




3,000 5,100 6.247 41.57 4,110
5,000 7,980 9.414 46.06 6,190
7,000 10,680 12.166 49.33 8,000




3,000 3,970 4.854 52.23 2,610
5,000 6,460 7.586 55.48 4,070
7,000 8,860 10.024 58.00 5,380
9,000 11,180 12.258 60.03 6,580
10,000 12,330 13.312 60.91 7,150
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Circular error probability, as formulated in this report,
results from three sources; system error, ballistic dispersion,
and a wind error term. System error and ballistic dispersion
may be combined in a root-mean-square error function given
by
:
RMS =\/(SE) 2 + (BD) 2 , (7)
where RMS = root mean square error due to the combined
effects of ballistic dispersion and system error,
in mils,
SE = system error, in mils,
BD = ballistic dispersion, in mils.
It must be remembered that system error and ballistic
dispersion are both measured relative to the line of fall of
the low drag bomb (slant range functions). To compute a
circular error probability measured with respect to the
ground plane an adjustment must be made for the angle of
impact. Figure 2 is a diagram of the geometric considera-
tions that are involved.
The combined system error and ballistic dispersion, RMS,
is converted to ground circular error probability by;
CEP = (RMS) ( SR ) , (8)
Sin 6
o
where CEP = circular error probability measured in feet,
RMS = root mean square error given by equation (7) in mils,
= angle of impact of the bomb as given by equation (2)
o
SR = slant range S as given by equation (6), in k-feet.
18

CEPA0J * System crwr + Ballistic
di&pe\r*»on
K- CEP'
Figure 2. Ground CEP vs. System and Ballistic CEP
The circular error probability as given by equation (8)
can be used to describe a system that is capable of compen-
sating for all wind errors (except gust error).
Two wind error functions will be used to modify the CEP
determined from equation (8). These functions are;











where W = random wind error component (net) measured in ft/sec
W = random wind error component (net) in ft/sec, k-ft
,
T = time of flight of the low drag bomb, in seconds,
ALT = altitude of release of the bomb in k-feet,
WE = wind error effect type I in feet, and




The two wind error functions, (9) and (10), are combined
with the circular error probability function, equation (8),
in a root mean square error function:
CEP =V(CEP) 2 + (WEj) 2 , and (11)
CEPjj = \/(CEP) 2 + (WE ) 2 ' . (12)
The circular error probability given by equation (11)
contains a wind error factor which is proportional to the
time of flight of the bomb. This circular error probability
would correspond to a system that is capable of compensating
for part of the wind error factors between the target and the
aircraft, e.g., the CP-741 system of the A-4F aircraft (Ref. 15)
The circular error probability generated by equation (12)
would be more characteristic of the less sophisticated
bombing system of the F-4 in which wind error compensation
is based primarily on pilot judgement.
Table 3 contains a summary of circular error probabilities
generated by equations (8), (11) and (12) for many aircraft
systems that are currently in use in the U.S. Navy and U.S.
Marine Corps. The data contained in Table 3 will be used in
the calculation of probability of kill and in the determin-
ation of the expected number of bombs required to kill a
target in Chapter IV. Figure 3 is a plot of CEP vs. altitude
of release for a 10 mil system (using equation (8)), a 26 mil





CEP vs. Altitude of Release
Basis: 450 knot aircraft speed, 1-G release, 5 mil bombs,
advertized A-7E system error 10 mils, A-4F system error 26
mils, F-4B system error 40 mils, W
T
= 2 knots, and W =
1.0 knots/k-feet . (Ref. 2, 13, 15, 19, 20)















3000 85.9 88.4 91.5 4110
5000 123.9 128.0 147.5 6190
7000 157.0 162.3 212.9 8000


































CEP vs. Altitude of Release















3000 203.3 204.4 205.7 4110
5000 293.4 295.1 303.9 6190
7000 371.8 374.1 398.6 8000
































CEP vs. Altitude of Release















3000 309.6 310.3 311.2 4110
5000 446.8 447.9 453.8 6190
7000 566.0 567.5 584.0 8000
9000 677.7 679.5 713.2 9630
0000 727.8 729.7 775.0 10380
-.
45 DIVE
3000 202.4 203.1 203.9 2610
5000 316.0 317.0 322.4 4080
7000 421.0 422.3 437.3 5380
9000 520.3 522.0 552.6 6580






Implicit in the definition of circular error probability
is an underlying bivariate normal distribution. It will be
assumed that \T =17", and that the mean point of impact of
x x
bombs dropped will be at target center. By carefully
choosing x- and y-axis (thus causing Q to equal zero) the




exp [- H& * £>J (13)
Under the assumption that the mean point of impact is at
target center, the probability of hitting a target is,
P(Hit) =
2V T Vx y A
JT -p {- iigi * £>])l ^ , (14)
where A = target area,
^T = standard deviation of impact points along x-axis,
x
rr- = standard deviation of impact points along y-axis.
By assuming that the target is a circle of radius R it is
possible to simplify equation (14). By letting n* = CT = (T"
x y
and converting to polar coordinates, equation (14) becomes,
P(Hit) = _L-
2irqr -aexp [-Z—-) r dr d6 ,
i? ( i de) (J.2tr^ ( r exp (-—2) dr) ,U ° 20"






where P(Hit ) = probability of hitting the target,
R = the radius of the target, in feet,
\T = standard deviation in feet.
From the definition of circular error probability (50% of
the bombs will impact within the stated value of CEP of the
target) and the assumption of a bivariate normal distribution
with CT = IT it is possible to convert circular error
x y
probability to standard deviation by,
CEP = 1.1774 T* (16)CEP
Suppose that in attacking a target we are interested in
whether or not the target is hit on any given pass, and
suppose the attack is continued until the first hit is
recorded. By defining the random variable X to be the
number of passes required for the first hit on the target
and by assuming that each pass is independent of other
passes it is possible to determine the distribution of X.
Since X can only assume integer (positive) values it is
apparent that k-1 failures (misses) must precede a hit on
the k pass, hence,
P X=k = (l-p)
k
"
p , k = 1, 2, ••• , (17)
is the distribution (the Geometric Distribution) of X where,
(1-p) = the single pass probability of a miss, and
p = the single pass probability of a hit.
If all attack aircraft are the same type and all are dropping
their bombs from the same altitude under essentially the
26

the same conditions, a value for p may be obtained by
solving equation (15).
To determine the expected number of passes required to
hit the target we may use the following relationship;
CO Co
e(x) = 2 kp(i-p)k_1 = 2 kp(q)
CO








where E(X) = the expected number of passes required for first
hit, and p is as previously described. If multiple hits on




where p (k/h ) = probability of kill given a target hit.
Equation (19) is proved in Chapter III.
The last relationship that will be discussed in this
chapter concerns the estimation of the minimum altitude that
the attack aircraft will attain after dropping its bomb.
The radius of turn for the attack aircraft pulling up from
its dive is given by,
2
RT = J , (20)
g\/N2-l
where RT = radius of turn in feet,
v = aircraft speed in feet/second,
N = the g-loading force on the aircraft, and
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Figure 4. Geometry of Radius of Turn, Minimum Altitude and
Position of Minimum Altitude.
It will be assumed that the aircraft will begin its pull
up 1000 feet below the point at which the bomb is dropped.
Figure 4 pictures the relevant geometric considerations.
Table 4 contains a summary of results for the solution of
equation (20) and its subsequent application as per Figure 4.
Table 4. Minimum Altitude and Position of the Attack Aircraft
BASIS; 450 KNOT AIRCRAFT SPEED































5-G 4-G 3-G 2-G
o
45 DIVE DATA
930 "640 140 crash
2930 2640 2140 970
4930 4640 4140 2970
6930 6640 6140 4970
7930 7640 7140 5970
-980 -1670 -2880 crash
490 -200 -1410 -4250
1800 1110 -100 -2940
3000 2310 1100 -1740
3560 2880 1670 -1170
30 DIVE DATA
1510 1380 1160 620
3510 3380 3160 2620
5510 5380 5160 4620
7410 7380 7160 6620
8510 8380 8160 7620
280 -210 -940 -3070
2360 1880 1020 -990
4170 3690 2830 820
5790 5310 4450 2450
6550 6070 5210 3200
In this chapter we developed the formulas and relation-
ships that will be needed to describe the air weapon system.
Before considering the ramifications that are involved in
attacking a target with the simultaneous use of air and
artillery, it will be necessary to quantitatively character-
ize the artillery system. The artillery system is analyzed
in Chapter III, and Chapter IV is devoted to interactions in
the attack of a target with air and artillery.
29

III. THE ARTILLERY MODEL
Having described the air delivery system in the previous
chapter, we will now focus on the artillery system. Careful
attention will be directed to data dealing with maximum
ordinate of trajectory, angle of impact, range error
probable, and deflection error probable as obtained from the
artillery firing tables currently used. Several probability
of hit models will be discussed as well as methods for cal-
culating the expected number of rounds required for the
destruction of a target. The M-109, 155mm, Self-Propelled
Howitzer will be used as the source of input data for the
artillery models that are developed in this chapter.
Table 5 is a summary of the trajectory characteristics
for the M-109, 155mm, Howitzer for low angle fire (gun
elevation less than 45 ). Also included are data on range
error probable, deflection error probable, standard deviation
of range, and standard deviation of deflection. Deflection
error probable and range error probable are converted to
standard deviation of deflection and standard deviation of
range, respectively, by application of the following
conversion factors:
DEP = 0.6745 1TDEF , (Ref. 18) (21)
and REP = 0.6745 CTD~ , (Ref. 18)KG
where DEP = deflection error probable in meters,




155mn] Howitzer Trajectory Characteristics
Charges: 1-5 Green, 6-7 White & 8 (Ref 4, 22)
*Data in parenthesis is upper 95 percentile prediction



















a) Charge 1 Green Bag i
500 7 (30) 56 (3.2) 4.4 (6.7) (0.7)
1000 28 (50) 117 (6.6) 7.4 (11.1) (0.7)
1500 66 (120) 181 (10.0) 10.4 (15.6) 1.5 (2.2)
2000 123 (200) 252 (14.2) 13.4 (20.0) 1.5 (2.2)
2500 204 (300) 330 (18.6) 17.8 (26.7) 1.5 (2.2)
3000 317 (440) 421 (23.6) 20.8 (31.2) 1.5 (2.2)
3500 484 (620) 533 (30.0) 25.2 (37.8) 1.5 (2.2)
4000 794 (950) 708 (39.8) 29.7 (44.6) 3.0 (4.4)
b) Charge 2 Green Bag
500 5 (30) 44 (2.3) 5.9 (8.9) (0.7)
1000 22 (60) 91 (5.1) 7.4 (11.1) (0.7)
1500 52 (110) 141 (7.9) 8.9 (13.4) 1.5 {2.2)
2000 95 (180) 195 (11.0) 11.9 (17.8) 1.5 (2.2)
2500 154 (250) 254 (14.5) 14.8 (22.3) 1.5 (2.2)
3000 233 (350) 318 (17.9) 17.8 (21.7) 1.5 (2.2)
3500 337 (480) 389 (21.9) 22.8 (33.4) 3.0 (4.4)























4500 675 (860) 575 (32.3) 29.7 (44.6) 3.0 (4.4)
5000 1074 (1270) 739 (41.5) 34.1 (51.2) 4.4 (6.7)
c) Charge 3 Green Bag
500 4 (20) 34 (1.9) 5.9 (8.9) (0.7)
1000 17 (50) 70 (3.9) 7.4 (11.1) 1.5 (2.2)
1500 39 (80) 109 (6.1) 8.9 (13.3) 1.5 (2.2)
2000 72 (130) 149 (8.4) 10.4 (15.6) 1.5 (2.2)
2500 116 (190) 193 (10.9) 13.4 (20.0) 1.5 (2.2)
3000 173 (260) 239 (13.5) 14.8 (22.2) 3.0 (4.4)
3500 245 (350) 290 (16.3) 17.8 (26.7) 3.0 (4.4)
4000 336 (460) 344 (19.3) 20.8 (31.1) 3.0 (4.4)
4500 448 (580) 405 (22.8) 23.8 (35.6) 4.4 (6.7)
5000 592 (740) 474 (26.6) 28.2 ( 42 . 3 ) 4.4 (6.7)
5500 782 (950) 555 (31.2) 31.2 (46.7) 4.4 (6.7)
6000 1061 (1240) 661 (37.2) 35.6 (53.4) 5.9 (8.9)
d) Charge 4 Green Bag
1000 13 (40) 54 (3.0) 8.9 (13.3) 1.5 (2.2)
2000 54 (100) 113 (6.4) 10.4 (15.6) 1.5 (2.2)
3000 129 (200) 179 (10.0) 11.9 (17.8) 3.0 (4.4)
4000 243 (340) 254 (14.3) 16.3 (24.5) 4.4 (6.7)






















6000 648 (790) 441 (24.8) 25.2 (37.8) 5.9 (8.9)
7000 1010 (1180) 568 (32.0) 31.1 (46.7) 7.4 (11.1)
8000 1771 (1960) 783 (44.0) 38.6 (57.8) 8.9 (13.3)
e) Charge 5 Green Bag
1000 10 (30) 41 (2.3) 10.4 (15.6) (0.7)
2000 42 (30) 90 (5.1) 10.4 (15.6) 1.5 (2.2)
3000 102 (160) 145 (8.2) 11.9 (17.8) 1.5 (2.2)
4000 193 (270) 205 (11.5) 13.3 (20.0) 3.0 (4.4)
5000 320 (420) 271 (15.2) 16.3 (24.5) 3.0 (4.4)
6000 492 (610) 346 (19.5) 19.3 (28.9) 4.4 (6.7)
7000 724 (860) 431 (24.2) 23.7 (35.6) 4.4 (6.7)
8000 1043 (1200) 530 (29.8) 28.2 ( 42 . 3 ) 5.9 (8.9)
9000 1521 (1700) 656 (36.9) 34.1 (51.2) 5.9 ( 8 -9)
9500 1900 (2090) 742 (41.7) 37.1 (55.6) 7.4 (11.1)
f) Charge 6 Whd.te Bag
1000 6 (20) 26 (1.5) 23.7 (35.6) (0.7)
2000 28 (60) 61 (3.4) 23.7 (35.6) 1.5 (2.2)
3000 70 (120) 105 (5.9) 23.7 (35.6) 1.5 (2.2)
4000 139 (200) 159 (8.9) 26.7 (40.0) 3.0 (4.4)
5000 241 (320) 218 (12.3) 29.7 (44.5) 3.0 (4.4)
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h) Charge 8 .
1000 3 (10) 12 [0.6) 47.4 [71.2) [0.7)
2000 12 [30) 26 [1.5) 43.0 [64.5) 1.5 [2.2)
3000 30 [60) 44 [2.5) 38.6 (57.8) 1.5 [2.2)
4000 59 [100) 67 [3.8) 35.6 [53.4) 1.5 1[2.2)
5000 101 |[150) 95 |[5.4) 32.6 [48.9) 1.5 (;2.2)
6000 160 |[220) 130 |[7.3) 31.1 |[46.7) 3.0 |[4.4)
7000 242 |[310) 173 |[9.7) 32.6 | [ 48 . 9 ) 3.0 {[4.4)
8000 353 |[430) 227 ([12.8]1 34.1 |[51.2) 3.0 <[4.4)
9000 501 ([590) 289 1[16. 3] 37.1 [55.6) 3.0 |[4.4)
10000 691
I
'790) 355 ('20. o; 1 41.5 |[62.3) 4.4
.('6.7)
11000 928 (;i040) 422 ('23.8] 44.5 |[66.7) 4.4 |[6.7)
12000 1217 ('1340) 490 ( 27.6] 48.9 ([73.4) 4.4 (,6.7)
13000 1564 ( 1700) 559 ('31.4] 51.9 ([77.8) 5.9 {[8.9)
14000 1978 ( 2130) 629 ( 35.4] 1 54.9 |[82.4) 5.9 <[8.9)
15000 2476 |[2640) 701 ( 39.4] 59.4 |[89.1) 5.9 |[8.9)
16000 3094 ([3260) 778 ( ' 43 . 8
]
62.4
{[93. 6) 7.4 |;n.i)
17000 3927 ( 4110) 867 ( 48.8) 68.3 ( 102.5 ) 7.4 ( 11.1)
18000 5736 ( 5940) 1023 ( 57.5) 74.2 { 111.3 ) 10.4 ( 15.6)
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IT = standard deviation range in meters,
DEF
^T = standard deviation range in meters.
The upper 95 percentile prediction interval value of the
data is included in Table 5 (Ref. 22). The information
contained in Table 5 will be used in the interaction models
that are developed in Chapter IV, as well as imput for models
developed in this chapter.
It will be assumed the fall of shot over the target area
is described by a bivariate normal distribution with (? = 0.
Then the density of the fall of shot distribution is,
f (x>V) - pw - - exp
* —-— - , —*— C
, (23)
where rr = standard deviation along x-axis in meters,
v x
ft, = mean point of impact along x-axis in meters,
0" = standard deviation along y-axis in meters, and
It, - mean point of impact along y-axis in meters.ry
The probability of a hit is calculated by solving
a
N
x v y C 2lTx 2 0yJ
where A = target area in square meters. Solution of equation
(24) is in general mathematically intractable except for
certain target shapes. Closed-form solutions exist in the
case of a circular target where it is assumed that (P = \T"
,
x y
and that the mean point of impact is at the target center as
was assumed in equation (15) in Chapter II. The assumption
36

that rp = tT is not amenable to the artillery model,
x y
therefore the result obtained in equation (15) is not
applicable to artillery fire. By assuming that the target






C* i c (x->s/?where P = \ exp ^- — > dx , and






where the target length along the x-axis extends from -L to




Under the assumption of a mean point of impact at target
center, P and P reduce to
' x y







= [^ exp ["^?I dy
•iY
-y
which can through proper change of variables be evaluated
using the standard normal distribution tables.
By assuming that the mean point of impact is at the
target center, that rr and rr* are "large" when compared with
v x y
the target dimensions, and by proper choice of x- and y- axis
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( to set P= 0), it is possible to obtain a simplified
form of equation (24) to be used in determining the proba-
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Since it has been assumed that R* and rr are "large" when
x v y









simultaneously for all (x- ,y. ) (2 dA, which are points on the




2it t x ctv 27r(r ry x y
(26)
where A = target area in square meters,
^T = standard deviation range in meters, and
x




Based on the single round hit probabilities that may be
calculated from equations (25) and (26), it would be desirable
to determine a method for calculating the expected number of
rounds required to hit a target. In his article, "On the
Computation of Hit Probability," Helgert points out that for
reasonable large values of round to round correlation, the
assumption of statistical independance between the effects
of rounds leads to large errors in the computation of the
hit distribution (Ref. 11). The simplest application of the
round to round correlation phenomenon involves the assumption
that the correlation depends only on the immediately preced-
ing round and no others. This assumption leads to the
development of the Markov-Dependent Fire model.
Both the independence criteria and the round to round
correlation criteria will be used in evaluating the expected
number of rounds required to hit a target. Under the
independence criteria the probability of achieving the first
hit on target on the n round is given by the Geometric
Distribution, py(n) = p(achieving 1 hit on n round ) =
p(l-p)
,
where p = single round hit probability from
equation (25) or (26), and n = 1, 2, 3, . The expected
number of rounds to achieve the first hit on the target may
be calculated using equation (18). Under the rounds
correlated criteria and using the results generated by
Helgert, the probability of achieving the first hit on target
th
on the n round is given by;
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p , for n=l
P
D
(m) M r ln-2 (2?)
(1-p) JjP(m|m)J • P(h[m) , for n > 2
where P(m|m) = the probability of a miss given a miss on
the previous round = q +Dp,
P(h|m) = the probability of a hit given a miss on the
previous round = p(l-p),
p = the probability that the first round is a hit —s
—
which is calculated from equation (25) or (26),
q = the probability that the first round is a
miss, 1-p, and
stP= the correlation between the (n-1) round and
th
the n round.
The expected number of rounds to first hit is given by
E(n) = 2nP
D









=pfifr . < 28)
Note that equation (28) reduces to equation (18) when there
is independence between rounds (9 =0 )»
Having developed a method for determining the number of
rounds required to first hit we must recognize the fact that
a target hit does not necessarily result in the destruction
of the target. It will be assumed that the number of hits
required to destroy a target is given by the Geometric Distributic
40







where P(KJH) = the probability of kill given a target hit,
and Z = the number of target hits = 1, 2, * ' ' . If the
distribution of the number of rounds, n, required for Z hits
is given by f (njz) = Pfn rounds obtain Z hits\ , where
Z^n, then the distribution of the number of rounds required
to destroy the target is
00
The average number of rounds, or expected number of rounds,
required to destroy the target is then
=,|"V n > =! n J!(P(z > fN|Z (n'z)I =
2p(z)J2 nfN|z (n| 2 ) =2 P( 2 ) E (n i 2) •
S. Bonder (Ref. 1) has solved equation (30) for Markov
Dependent Fire whose probability of first round hit was
given by equation (27). Bonder's solution of equation (30)
for Markov Dependent Fire yeilds
where p = first round probability of hit, which may be
calculated from equation (25) or (26), P(k)h) = probability
of kill given a target hit, and O = the correlation between
the (n-1) and the n round. Bonder's solution for
41

Markov Dependent Fire may be applied to the case where it
has been assumed that there is no correlation between rounds,




which is equation (19).
In this chapter we used information about the artillery
system from the firing tables to examine three methods for
calculating single round hit probabilities for the artillery
system. Methods for calculating the number of rounds to
first hit, and the number of rounds to kill a target (multiple
hits required) were presented for two cases. One case
involved the assumption of independence between rounds and
the other involved Markov Dependent Fire. With the charac-
terizations that are developed in Chapters II and III, it is
now possible for us to examine the detains of the attack of
a target with both air and artillery.
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IV. THE ATTACK OF A TARGET WITH THE SIMULTANEOUS
USE OF AIR AND ARTILLERY
In this chapter we will examine the factors involved
in attacking a target with the simultaneous use of air and
artillery. The concept of the (Artillery Trajectory)
Danger Air Space will be developed, as well as a method for
calculating the expected total number of projectiles, bombs
and artillery shells, required to destroy a target. The
measure of effectiveness that will be used in this study is
the expected total time required to destroy a target.
Several numerical examples of the simultaneous attack of a
target will be presented with varying gun-target ranges,
aircraft dive angles, bomb release altitudes for several
aircraft systems.
The air space in the scenario for the attack of a
target with the simultaneous use of air and artillery may be
separated into two mutually exclusive spaces, which we will
identify as the Danger Air Space and its complement. The
Danger Air Space is a portion of the air space that contains
essentially all of the trajectories of the artillery that is
firing on the target. An effort is made in identifying the
Danger Air Space to anticipate all but the most flagrant of
gunnery and ballistic errors. The use of upper 95 percen-
tile prediction interval data, and the use of the "cookie
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/5f>3 ie ol impact
Figure 5. The Artillery Trajectory Danger Air Space
assures a Danger Air Space which will include essentially
all of the artillery trajectories. Figure 5 is a sketch of
the (Artillery Trajectory) Danger Air Space.
In the development of the dimensions for the Danger Air
Space several assumptions were made, that if an error is
going to be made on the gun and not be detected before
firing it will be a 100 mil error in deflection. Another
assumption is that since the last range bracket that is
halved in the adjustment phase of fire is 100 meters long,
that the mean point of impact will be within 50 meters of
the target center. A 100 meter safety factor will be added
to the Danger Air Space. The use of the upper 95 percen-
tile prediction interval value for standard deviation of
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range, standard deviation of deflection, and maximum ordinate
essentially guarantees the inclusion of the worst possible
case (artillery trajectory) within the Danger Air Space.
The length of the Danger Air Space is given by,
R = R + 3tT + 100 , (32)DAS GT RG
where RnAC = the length of the Danger Air Space in meters
measured from the gun through the target center and beyond
the target,
R = the range between the gun and the target (oftenGT
referred to as the gun-target range) in meters, and
0" = the upper 95 percentile prediction interval
standard deviation of range comenserate with the method of
fire employed and such factors as change and angle of fire.
The 100 meter constant is a safety factor. The width of the
Danger Air Space is taken as
W = 200 R , + 6T
,
(33)
DAS DAS(K) DF ' V '
where W c = the width of the Danger Air Space centered on
the target and perpendicular to the gun-target line, measured
in meters,
^DASfKl
= the l en9th °f the Danger Air Space calculated
from equation (32) measured in k-meters, and
v
~ thv
DF - the upper 95 percentile prediction interval
standard deviation of deflection, in meters
The 200 mil coefficient converts the 100 mil deflection
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safety factor (on either side of the gun-target line) into
a linear measure. The angle of fire and the angle of impact
are obtained from the artillery firing tables. The maximum
ordinate used in the Danger Air Space is the upper 95
percentile prediction interval maximum ordinate commensurate
with the method of fire employed. By using three standard
deviations in range and deflection we should insure the
inclusion of at least 998 rounds of every 1000 rounds fired
before adding the safety factors. The 100 meter range
safety factor is larger than all the standard deviations of
range listed in Table 6. The 100 mil deflection safety
factor results in deflection distances that are much larger
than the artillery standard deviations of deflections listed
in Table 6. Under the characteristics of the Normal Distri-
bution that describes the fall of shot for artillery, and
under the design of the Danger Air Space it is clear that
the Artillery Trajectory Danger Air Space should include
at least 9,999 rounds of every 10,000 fired.
The measure of effectiveness that will be used in this
study is the expected time required to destroy the target.
It will be assumed that the rate of fire of the artillery
system is constant at one round per minute, which is the
sustained rate of fire of the 155mm Howitzer (Ref. 5). The
rate of fire (delivery) of the attack aircraft is also
taken to be constant. It will be assumed that there is no
correlation between the impact point of a bomb and the
impact point of an artillery shell. At any time in the
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attack of a target the probabilities that a projectile is
a bomb or an artillery shell are calculated by,
P(air) = _ ^i*
^
and (34)
rair fa rt y
P(arty) = - ^^ , (35)
•air »artv
where P = the rate of fire (delivery) of the attack
air
aircraft in bombs per minute, and P = the rate of fireK
' arty
of the artillery system in rounds per minute. The single
round probability of hit for the combined air-artillery
system is calculated by,
P(Hit) = P(Hit|arty) • P(arty) + P(Hit)air) • P(air), (36)
where P(Hitjarty) = the single round probability of hit for
the artillery system which is calculated from either
equation (25) or (26), P(Hit|air) = the single round proba-
bility of hit for the air attack system based on calculations
using equation (15), P(air) and P(arty) are as defined by
equations (34) and (35) respectively. Under the assumption
of independence between all rounds, the probability of hit
th
on the m round is described by the Geometric Distribution,
P(l st Hit on mth round) = [l - P(Hit)] m ~ • P(Hit)
,
(37)
where P(Hit) is given by equation (36) and m = 1, 2, 3** # .
The expected number of rounds to first hit, from equation
(18) is, m = . Since the rates of fire of the air
P( Hi t )
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and artillery are determinate, then the time to first hit
is given by,
T(l St Hit) = ; = ^ , (38)
P(Hit) Tp . + p . 1v
' L' air arty J
where P(Hit) is calculated from equation (36), p . and
sir
r* are the rates of fire of the air and artillery systems
arty
st
respectively, and T(l Hit) is the average time required to
hit the target for the first time, in minutes.
With the multiple hits required to kill a target, the
probability of kill is,
P( killed }
= P( kill |hit y )* P ( Hit l arty )- P ( arty ) +
(39)
P(killJ a^)-P(Hit|air).P(air),
where p ( ki 11 |v1it ) = the Pr°t>ability the target is destroyed





= the probability the target is destroyed
given a target hit by a bomb,
P(hitlarty) = the single round probability of hit by
an artillery shell, and
P(hitlair) = the single round probability of hit by
a bomb.
Here the P(air) and P(arty) are as given by equation (34)
and equation (35) respectively. Under the independence
criterion the probability x>£ kill of a target with M rounds
is given by the Geometric Distribution,
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LI M-]l-P(kill)J -P(kill), (40)
where P(kill) is calculated from equation (39) and M = 1, 2,*'
The expected number of rounds/bombs that are required to kill
the target can be calculated from equation (18) with the
result that M = l/P(kill). The conversion of the number of
rounds/bombs required to kill the target to the time re-
quired to kill the target is
1
T(kill target) = . (41)
p(kiii) (r . + r
_ )v
'
v air arty 7
where P(kill) is calculated from equation (39), p . and
air
F . are the rates of fire of the air and artillery systemsarty ' '
respecitvely , and T(kill target) is the time in minutes
required to kill the target.
At this point in the analysis we have developed the
relationships and concepts that are needed to investigate
both the dangers and the advantages of attacking a target
with simultaneous air delivery and artillery. This will be
done with a series of examples involving various combinations
of mode of attack by the attack aircraft and the artillery
guns.
Example 1. The basis for example 1 is a gun-target range of
4000 meters, a 10 mil aircraft system, and a 26 mil aircraft
system. Table 6 is an abstract of data from Table 5 that







Possible Firing Data for a Gun-Target Range of 4,000 Meters
95% Angle Angle
PER PED Max.Ord. Fire Impact
Charge (m.) ( m «) ( m «) (deg.) ( deg .
)
39.8
27.5 25.2 (37.8) 3.0 (4.4)
19.3 20.8 (31.1) 3.0 (4.4)
14.3 16.3 (24.5) 4.4 (6.7)
13.5
8.9
1 20 2 950 37.1
2 17 2 640 24.5
3 14 2 460 17.8
4 11 2 340 13.1
5 9 2 270 10.1
6 18 2 200 7.0
The charges that will be used in this example are green 2,
green 3, and green 4, which are the charges that are most
likely to be chosen by the firing battery Fire Direction
Officer. The dimensions of the Danger Air Space as calculated
from equations (32) and (33), and as abstracted from Table 6
for charges two, three and four are listed in Table 7. The
Table 7 values for R
.
and W have been rounded up. Com-
DAS DAS F
parison of the maximum ordinate data in Table 7 with the
minimum altitude data contained in Table 4 reveals that
aircraft dropping their bombs from 5000 feet or higher
altitudes from 45 or 30° dives with a minimum 3-G pull-up





The Dimensions of the Danger Air Space
ANGLE ANGLE UPPER 95%
>F FIRE OF IMPACT MAX. ORD.
METERS METERS FEET METERS FEET
R WCHARGE DAS DAS OF
2 4220 880 2887 24.5°
3 4200 870 2854 17.8°




At this point we wish to assess the feasibility of
attacking the target with aircraft that are releasing their
bombs at 3000 feet during a 45° dive. For the aircraft to
release their bombs below 5000 feet it becomes necessary for
the Forward Air Controller to restrict the azimuth of the
attack aircraft approach. In determining the azimuths that
are feasible we will base out calculations on a bomb miss
distance of three standard deviations of CEP (recall that
CEP = 1.177401 ) from the target in the direction of
maximum probability of interaction with the Danger Air









S = ^^T^p + 30^ +3*8 £e«.t
Figure 6. Aircraft 90° to Gun-Target Line, Level Flight,
Danger Air Space Interaction
TABLE 8
Results of Aircraft/Danger Air Space Interaction for 90 Azimuth
(All values in feet except charge and 4 impact)
yr 10 MIL SYSTEM 26 MIL SYSTEM






1450 2900 845 439.9
1450 2900 780 273.3
1450 2900 715 182.2
1450 2900 1041 542.1
1450 2900 975 341.6






Figure 7. Aircraft 60 to Gun-Target Line, Level Flight,




Results of Aircraft/Danger Air Space Interaction, 60 Azimuth
(All values in feet except charge andj£ impact)
CHARGE IMPACT
10 MIL SYSTEM
d 1 S ALT@S
26 MIL SYSTEM




1757 3350 1702 886.0
1757 3272 1636 572.9
1757 3142 1571 400.2
1872 3350 1931 1005.4
1872 3350 1865 653.2
1872 3350 1800 458.9




Figure 8. Aircraft 45 to Gun-Target Line, Level Flight,
Danger Air Space Interaction
TABLE 10
Results of Aircraft/Danger Air Space Interaction, 45 Azimuth







27.5 2193 3323 2352 1224.3
19.3° 2193 3240 2286 800.5
14.3° 2193 3142 2221 566.1
2392 3721 2633 1370.5
2392 3492 2567 898.9




S'Wps Cot(30°}4+ 30"^ Csc(30°)+ 3TRa 4 321 *e«f
*i
,oFigure 9. Aircraft 30 to Gun-Target Line, Level Flight
Danger Air Space Interaction
TABLE 11
o
Results of Aircraft/Danger Air Space Interaction, 30 Azimuth










27.5° 3147 4041 3497 1820.4
19.3° 3147 3962 3431 1201.5
14.3° 3147 3897 3366 858.0
3491 4490 3894 2027.1
3491 4420 3828 1340.6
3491 4348 3763 959.2
For an aircraft traveling along the gun-target line in
level flight the maximum ordinate encountered is 2100 feet
for charge 2, 1510 feet for charge 3, and 1120 feet for
charge 4. Figure 10 pictures the worst case interaction for









CC = Artillery angle* o{ impact
^-j Aircraft dive angle
S * 3<3*cgp 4 *3TRa + 32ft feet
The altitude at which the aircraft intrudes into the
Danger Air Space, A T , is calculated from,




sin (p -o( )
where o( = the angle of impact of the artillery shell,
ft = the dive angle of the aircraft, and
S = the distance from the edge of the Danger Air
Space through the target as pictured in Figure 10. For the
data that characterizes this example, Aj is equal to 917.5
feet for charge 2, 420.4 feet for charge 3, and 244.6 feet
for charge 4. By superimposing the standoff range data in
Table 3 over the aircraft path relative to the impact point
in Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9, and then by carefully analyzing
the implications of minimum altitude and the position at
which the minimum altitude occurs (as per Table 4), it is
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Figure 11. Safe Azimuth of Attack for Bomb Dropped Below
5000' and Above 3000' from 30 or 40° Dives
with 3-G, 4-G, or 5-G pull up.
GUN TARGET
clear that any aircraft approach azimuth at -90° to the gun-
target line will be safe, i.e., it will not penetrate the
Danger Air Space for bomb delivered at 3000 feet or higher
altitudes from 30 or 45 dive angles. Pull up at 3-G' s or
higher are required, with 4-G or 5-G pull up preferred, to
allow an even greater margin of safety. Figure 11 diagrams
the safe approach azimuths for the aircraft attacking the
target
.
It should be noted that the maximum ordinate of the
Danger Air Spaces for this scenario allows the attack of
the target from any azimuth for aircraft in level flight
under TPQ-27 Radar control at 2600 feet or higher altitude
without any danger of penetrating the Danger Air Space.
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Now that we have determined the modes of attack that are
feasible for the attack aircraft, we may assess the advan-
tages of attacking the target with the air-artillery system.
For this analysis we shall consider, 1) a circular target
with a 20 foot diameter, 2) a rate of fire for the artillery
of one round per minute, 3) a rate of delivery for the
attack aircraft of one bomb per minute, 4) a P(kill| artillery
hit) of 0.25, 5) a P(kill)air hit) of 0.75, 6) a gun-target
range of 4000 meters, and 7) the 155mm Howitzer fires charges
2, 3, and 4 green bag propellant.
The artillery single shot probability of a hit is
calculated from equation (26). The attack aircraft single
shot probability of hit is calculated from equation (15).
Table 12 contains the results of the calculations that are
required to assess the advantages of attacking the target
with air and artillery. Listed in Table 12 are the expected
times to destroy the target for the artillery system, the
10 mil, and 26 mil aircraft systems, and all combinations
of the air-artillery system. Analysis of the percentage of
time saved for the combined air-artillery system relative to
the air system shows the advantage that is gained through
the use of the combined system, as a direct result of effec-
tively doubling the rate of fire on the target. A 30.1%
reduction in the time to destroy the target from the air point
of view, implies that less air sorties are needed. Addition-
ally, the smaller the number of sorties required to destroy
the target, the smaller the probability of losing an aircraft




Summary of Results for Example 1







73.0 0.0093 3000 30° 0.75 173.6 0.0017
47.6 0.0218 3000 45° 0.75 113.8 0.0039
105.2 0.0045 5000 30°
. 0.75 250.6 0.0008
74.4 0.0090 5000 45° 0.75 177.5 0.0016
155mm Howitzer System
UPPER UPPER
CHARGE TRG ^op P(HIT) 95% <TRG 95%^ P(HIT) P(KILl| HIT)
2 25.2 3.0 0.0615 37.8
3 20.8 3.0 0.0745 31.1
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Example 2. The basis for this example is a gun-target
range of 8,000 meters, a 10 mil aircraft system, and a 26
mil aircraft system. Table 13 contains possible artillery
firing data for a gun-target range of 8,000 meters.
TABLE 13
155mm Howitzer Firing Data for 8,000 Meter Gun-Target Range
95% Angle Angle
PER PED Max.Ord. Fire Impact
Charge (m.) (m.) (m. ) (deg.) (deg.)
1200 25.1 29.8 28.2 (42.3) 5.9 (8.9)
910 18.2 23.7 40.0 (60.0) 5.9 (8.9)
660 12.6 18.7 35.6 (53.4) 4.4 (6.7)








For the example charges 6 white and 7 white will be used.
The dimensions of the Danger Air Space, as calculated from
equations (32) and (33), are listed in Table 14.
TABLE 14
Danger Air Space Dimensions for a Gun-Target Range of 8,000 M,
R w ANGLE ANGLE UPPER 95%CHARGE DAS DAS OF FIRE OF IMPACT MAX. ORD.
METERS METERS FEET METERS FEET
6 8280 1709 5606 18.2 23.7 910 2985
7 8260 1692 5550 12.6 18.7 660 2165
60

Based on the data contained in Table 4 and the maximum
ordinate data for charges 6 and 7 , unrestricted attack
of the target by aircraft is possible for 30 dives at alti-
tudes of release of 5,000 feet or higher and for 45 dives at
release altitudes of 6,000 feet or higher. Table 15 contains
the interaction data between the Danger Air Space and the
attack aircraft for aircraft approaching from*90°, 60°, 45°,
and 30° to the gun-target line. The data in Table 15 is
based on 3,000 foot release CEP for a 10 mil and a 26 mil
aircraft system.
By superimposing the standoff range data from Table 3
relative to the bomb impact point, in conjunction with the
minimum altitude and position of minimum altitude data from
Table 4 for the various approach azimuths in Table 15, it is
apparent that all modes of attack, 30° or 45 dive with
releases at 3,000 feet or higher, at -90 or less to the gun-
target line, are safe. The only exception to this result is
that all 45° dive, 3,000 foot release attacks made between
60 and 90° require the additional restriction of a 4-G or
5-G pull up. The approach azimuth diagram for Example 1,
Figure 11, is applicable to this example with the previously
mentioned additional requirement on the 45° at 3,000 feet
between 60° and 90°.
Having determined the safe modes of attack for the attack
aircraft, we are ready to assess the advantages of attacking
the target with the combined air-artillery system. For the




Danger Air Space/Attack Aircraft Level Flight Interaction Data
Basis: 10 mil A/C ^TCEp=47.6 ft., 26 mil A/C IT =113.8 ft.
(All values in feet except charge and angle of impact)
am^th- nr 10 MIL SYSTEM 26 MIL SYSTEMANGLE OF
CHARGE IMPACT d d' S ALT@S d d' S ALT@S
a) Aircraft Approach at 90 to Gun-Target Line, (Figure 6)
6 23.7 2800 5600 1061 465.7 2800 5600 1260 553.1
7 18.7 2800 5600 996 337.1 2800 5600 1195 404.5
b) Aircraft Approach at 60 to Gun-Target Line, (Figure 7)
6 23.7 3316 5400 2700 1185.2 3430 5858 2929 1285.7
7 18.7 3316 5270 2635 891.9 3430 5728 2864 969.4
c) Aircraft Approach at 45 to Gun-Target Line, (Figure 8)
6 23.7 4103 5544 3920 1720.8 4301 5941 4201 1844.1
7 18.7 4103 5453 3856 1305.2 4301 5849 4136 1400.0
d) Aircraft Approach at 30 to Gun-Target Line, (Figure 9)
6 23.7 5816 6990 6054 2657.5 6191 7449 6451 2831.8
7 18.7 5816 6915 5989 2027.2 6191 7374 6386 2161.5
e) Aircraft Approach at 0° to Gun-Target Line in a 45° Dive,
(Figure 10)





6 1061.2 830.3 1259.8 985.7
7 996.3 509.8 1194.9 611.4
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target 30 feet in diameter, 2) a rate of fire for the 155mm
Howitzer of one round per minute, 3) a rate of delivery for
the attack aircraft of one bomb per minute, 4) a probability
of kill given an artillery hit of 0.30, 5) a probability of
kill given an air hit of 0.80, 6) a gun-target range of
8,000 meters, and 7) the Howitzer using charges 6 and 7
white bag propellent.
The single shot probability of hit for both the air and
artillery system is calculated from equation (26). The
expected time to kill the target is determined from equation
(41) for the air attack, artillery attack, and the air-
artillery attack system. Table 16 is a summary of hit proba-
bilities, and expected time to kill the target data for the
155mm Howitzer artillery system, a 10 mil attack aircraft
system, a 26 mil attack aircraft system, and for all combin-
ations of the air-artillery attack system.
As was the case in Example 1, we again realize a signif-
icant saving in the expected time to destroy the target
relative to the air system, due to the effective doubling of
the rate of fire on the target. This implies that fewer
sorties are required to destroy the target, and hence less
exposure of the attack aircraft to the hostile environment
of the battle area. In the next chapter we will discuss





Summary of Results for Example 2
10 MIL A/C SYSTEM DIVE 26 MIL A/C SYSTEM




















CHARGE 0- <T P(HIT) 95% V 95^>T^ P(HIT) P(KILl)hIT)RG DF
6 40.0 5.9 0.0443 60.0 8.9 0.0196 0.30
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V. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FURTHER STUDY
In this chapter we will consider the restrictions that
must be placed on the artillery system in the combined
attack, and then based upon the artillery system restric-
tions, we will develop the air system restrictions. We
will then consider the advantages and disadvantages of using
the simultaneous air-artillery attack system. The report
will be concluded with some recommendations for further
study
.
One restriction that must be placed on the artillery
system is that no V-T fuzed artillery shells may be used in
the attack of any target in the vicinity of the area where
the combined air-artillery attack system is being used.
These fuzes were originally designed for use with anti-
aircraft artillery projectiles, and therefore are extremely
sensitive to any aircraft or other material that might be
in the air. The exclusion of V-T fuzes greatly decreases
the possibility that a distant aircraft might be damaged by
"friendly" artillery shells. A second restriction on the
artillery system is that the angle of impact of the artillery
shells must be less than or equal to 30 (533 mils). Table
17 lists the maximum gun-target range, the highest 95
percentile maximum ordinate, the largest 95 percentile
standard deviation of range, and a representative value of
the terminal velocity of the artillery projectile for
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charges 1 green bag to 5 green bag, 6 white bag, 7 white
bag and charge 8. The data that is contained in Table 17
will be used to develop the attack aircraft restrictions.
TABLE 17
Artillery Restrictions
Maximum Largest Highest Rep. Rel.Veloc. to
Gun- Target Upper 95% Upper 95% Terminal an A/C Moving
Charge Range
^TrG Max. Ord. Velocity at 450 Knots
(meters) (meters) (feet) (knots) (knots)
1G 3,500 37.8 2,035 379 -71
2G 4,200 40.6 2,395 420 -30
3G 5,200 43.6 2,707 464 14
4G 6,700 44.0 3,488 517 67
5G 8,000 42.3 3,937 554 104
6W 9,200 71.0 4,233 580 130
7W 10,500 62.3 4,364 622 172
8 12,500 75.6 4,987 640 190
In keeping with the tenet of basing conclusions on worst
case planning, the Danger Air Space width will not be given
any limit. This will allow other artillery units to attack
any other target that is short of a line through the air-
artillery target, and perpendicular to the Danger Air Space
gun-target line, as long as the angle of impact of the other
artillery units' fire is less than 30° (533 mils). Table 18
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Figure 12. Attack Aircraft in 45° Dive Interacting with 30




Results of Interaction Between a 26 mil Aircraft System
and the Maximum Danger Air Space
Basis: 30° Angle of Impact, 45° Aircraft Dive, V^Ep=ll3.8 Feet
(Notation defined on previous page)
30"
CEP RESULTS
TPQ 27 UPPER 95% Q A A ALT. OVER
MIN.ALT. CHARGE MAX.ORD. I IA BIP
(FEET) (FEET) (FEET) (FEET) (FEET)
2500 1G 2035 1042 1423 887 602
2900 2G 2395 1069 1460 928 617
3200 3G 2707 1095 1491 959 632
4000 4G 3488 1103 1507 970 637
4400 5G 3937 1086 1483 947 627
4700 6W 4233 1368 1869 1332 790
4900 7W 4364 1283 1753 1216 741
5500 8 4987 1414 1932 1395 816
4<TCEP RESULTS
TPQ 27 UPPER 95%
s A A ALT. OVER
MIN.ALT. CHARGE MAX.ORD. 4 14 IA4 BIP4
(FEET) (FEET) (FEET) (FEET) (FEET)
2500 1G 2035 1156 1579 1042 667
2900 2G 2395 1183 1616 1079 683
3200 3G 2707 1209 1651 1115 698
4000 4G 3488 1217 1662 1126 703
4400 5G 3937 1200 1639 1102 693
4700 6W 4233 1482 2024 1488 856
4900 7W 4364 1397 1908 1371 807
5500 8 4987 1528 2087 1550 882
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aircraft system with the Danger Air Space that is given by
the data contained in Table 17.
By carefully interacting the data contained in Table 18
with the minimum altitude and position of the aircraft at
minimum altitude data contained in Table 4, we can determine
the attack azimuths that are safe for the attack aircraft.
Figure 13 is a graphical representation of the safe azimuths
for the attack aircraft relative to the gun-target line.
Table 19 contains a summary of safe azimuths for the attack
aircraft. The upper 95% maximum ordinate data with a 500
foot safety factor represents the level flight TPQ-27 radar
air drop without any azimuth restrictions (Table 18). The
safe azimuths given in Table 19 are based on a 10° to 15
azimuth miss safety factor.
TABLE 19
Safe Azimuths for Bomb Releases at 3000, 4000 and 5000 Feet




SAFE AZIMUTHS FOR BOMBS SAFE AZIMUTHS FOR BOMBS
DROPPED FROM 45° DIVE DROPPED FROM 30° DIVE
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if an aircraft released its bombs at 3000
.ofeet from a 45 dive, it could do so without any danger of
intruding into the Danger Air Space as long as its attack
azimuth was between +75 and -75 relative to the gun-target
line, even though the azimuth is limited to -60 by Table 19,
Now that we have developed the restrictions that must be
imposed on the air attack and artillery systems, we are
ready to consider the advantages and disadvantages that are
involved in attacking a target with the simultaneous use of
air and artillery. First we shall examine some of the
disadvantages associated with the use of the combined air-
artillery attack system.
1. There is a limitation on the type of fuzes that may
be used. This is really not a severe drawback in that VT
fuzes are not normally used in a situation where we are
interested in destroying a hard point target.
2. There are range limitations that must be imposed on
the artillery system as a result of the angle of impact
restriction. In precision destruction missions the choice
of the charge that is to be used is based upon the location
of the target, problems with intervening terrain features,
and the range and deflection dispersion data. The angle of
impact limitation includes the best possible range and
deflection dispersion characteristics for all charges.
3. Low angle fire is the only method that should be
used. High angle fire (firing angle greater than 45°) is
not normally used in attempting to destroy a hard target in
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that high angle fire involves very large range and deflection
dispersion.
4. The attack aircraft are limited in the azimuths that
they may use in low altitude attacks against the target.
5. Another factor is the aircraft pilots' feelings of
apprehension of artillery shells in proximity to their
aircraft. The pilots' apprehension is probably due to a
lack of understanding. Proper education might eliminate or
effectively counter this problem.
6. Implementation of this method of attack will require
close cooperation between the air, artillery, and infantry.
The advent of the universal forward observer, and the
integrated Fire Support Coordination/Direct Air Support
function will do much to smooth out the liaison problems
that are implied in the use of this method of attack.
7. The artillery must be in, or ready to begin, the
Fire-for-Effeet phase of fire before the air strikes begin.
This is due to the fact that during the Adjustment phase of
fire, it is not unusual that initial bold range and deflec-
tion changes of 400 to 600 meters might be required in
establishing a fall of shot bracket over the target. This
requirement of being in, or ready for, Fire-for-Effeet is
not a serious problem in that the artillery should be well
into the Fire-for-Effeet phase before the strike aircraft
arrive on station and are ready to begin their strikes.
Having considered some disadvantages of the combined
air-artillery attack system, we are ready to examine some
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advantages that are realized as a result of employing the
combined air-artillery attack system over the old method of
firing artillery, interrupting the artillery fire, bringing
in the air strikes, delaying some more, then resuming the
artillery fire. The advantages of the combined air-artillery
attack include:
1. Once the attack on the target begins, it will not
be interrupted until the target is destroyed. There is no
need to interrupt the artillery fire to allow the air strikes
to begin. If the target is not destroyed after the attack
aircraft have expended their last bomb, the artillery can
continue firing until the target is destroyed.
2. Target acquisition by the air strike force is greatly
enhanced. The artillery can provide target replot data to
the attack aircraft, which may then be used as an input into
the aircraft avionics system. The artillery bursts may also
be used by the Forward Air Controller as a reference point
for the target location and identification.
3. As a direct result of the reduction in the expected
time to destroy the target, we may infer that fewer aircraft
attack passes will be required on the average to destroy the
target. This means that there is a reduction in the number
of sorties that are required to destroy the target over
what would be required if only air were used to destroy the
target. Since fewer sorties are required, it is apparent
that the aircraft will have a shorter total exposure time,
over the total exposure for the pure air attack case, and
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therefore on a target destroyed basis, the expected cost in
lost aircraft will be lower. If the target is impeding the
advance of an infantry force, then the quicker we can
eliminate the target, the quicker the infantry force can
continue to move, and therefore the shorter the infantry's
exposure time to enemy fire.
4. Other artillery pieces may attack any other target
that falls within the envelope of the Danger Air Space.
This allows the immediate attack of any anti-aircraft system
that might become apparent during the air operations in the
battle area. The more that we are able to reduce the enemy's
capability to bring fire against our attack aircraft, the
greater will be our savings in terms of the cost of the
target destruction.
5. Time-on-target techniques may be used with the TFQ-27
radar controlling the air dropped ordnance in coordination
with the artillery fire control system. This type of time-
on-target technique involves a greater shock effect, larger
target area coverage, and can result in greater damage to
the enemy force without any loss of surprise as compared to
the effects of the normal pure artillery time-on-target fire.
Having examined some of the advantages and disadvantages
of the combined air-artillery attack system, we are now able
to consider recommendations for further analysis. These
recommendations for further study include the development
of more general models in which gaussian lethality functions
are applied to the air attack system and to the artillery
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system. This would allow the assessment of the combined
air-artillery attack system against a full spectrum of
actual target types. The effects of target location uncer-
tainty could also be included in this study.
Another possible area that would be valuable to study
would be the application of the combined air-artillery
system against a large area target, such as a mixed armor-
infantry attack involving battalion size units.
Trade off implications of the combined air-artillery
technique for a pure artillery attack or a pure air attack
in a scenario in which we are limited in available supporting
arms resources could be examined.
A multiple-gun artillery attack involving "closed sheaf"
volley fire in combination with multiple bombs dropped on
each attack aircraft pass could also be studied. Addition-
ally, this study should include the use of multiple-gun
artillery attacks from different firing sites in conjunction
with the air attack system.
A statistical .analysis of the precision distruction
mission for the purpose of estimating the correlation
between rounds for various gun-target ranges, plus a statis-
tical analysis involving least squares regression of CEP as
a function of release altitude, and a statistical analysis
of an air attack against a point target to determine if
there is any correlation between passes (for the same air-
craft or flight of aircraft) would be valuable.
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It is hoped that the analysis of this supporting arms
application technique will be of assistance to future
tacticians, and will generate an interest in future inves-




The purpose of this study was to assess the feasibility
of simultaneously using close air support attack and artil-
lery in attacking a target. The feasibility of this tactic
is clearly demonstrated if certain restrictions are imposed
on the artillery and air attack systems. The artillery
restrictions involve limiting angles of fire to those which
result in angles of impact of 533 mils (30°) or less and
the exclusion of V-T fuzed projectiles. A "Danger Air Space"
is specified which includes almost all of the possible
artillery trajectories in attacking the target. From the
geometric implications of the Danger Air Space, restrictions
for the attacking aircraft are then established. These
restrictions are based upon three assumptions, that aircraft
pull-up begins no later than 1000 feet below the bomb release
point (1.9 seconds after bomb release for an aircraft diving
at 45 and moving at 450 knots, or 2.6 seconds for an air-
craft diving at 30 and moving at 450 knots), that the
aircraft executes a minimum 3-G pull-up, and that the attack
aircraft does not exceed the allowable attack azimuth
restrictions by more than 15 . From these assumptions it
was determined that for bombs released at 3000 feet from a
45 dive, the safe attack azimuths were -60° relative to the
artillery gun-target line. The safe attack azimuths for a
45 dive and bomb release at 5000 feet are -135° relative to
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the artillery gun-target line. Similar azimuth restrictions
were developed for other modes of aircraft delivery.
Some of the disadvantages of the simultaneous air-
artillery attack technique are:
1) the exclusion of V-T fuzed artillery projectiles,
2) the maximum allowable gun-target range for the 155mm
Howitzer of 12,500 meters (charge 8),
3) the exclusion of high angle fire for the artillery,
4) the limitations on the attack azimuths of the strike
aircraft
,
5) the possible feelings of apprehension on the pilot's
part due to the proximate artillery shells,
6) the requirement of close cooperation between infantry,
air, and artillery in implimentation of the technique, and
7) the artillery must be in, or ready for, fire-for-
effect before the air strikes begin.
Some advantages of the simultaneous use of air and
artillery in attacking a target are:
1) once the attack begins, it is not interrupted until
the target is destroyed,
2) target aquisition by the air strike force is
enhanced,
3) the reduction in time to destroy the target due to
the increased rate of fire over conventional methods results
in fewer sorties required to destroy the target, less ex-
posure time to both the infantry and the attack aircraft (due
to the more rapid destruction of the target),
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4) other artillery units or guns are free to attack
other targets that may become apparent within the Danger Air
Space envelope, during the air strikes, and
5) time-on-target techniques involving TFQ-27 radar
directed air strikes and artillery are feasible (when compared
to normal pure artillery time-on-target missions, this mixed
air-artillery time-on-target mission can result in greater
shock, larger target area coverage, and a greater potential
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